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Book Reviews
CoujIT: A SYNcosrum. Edited by
Huro BLAcK Am Tm Supmvma
Stephen Parks Strickland. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company,
Inc., 1967. Pp. 340. $10.00.

No one should be surprised that Hugo Lafayette Black has inspired this able symposium. After all, Black was the first of the new
breed of Justices who came to the Supreme Court of the United States
after 1937; thirty years later, he is not only still on the bench but is
generally recognized as the intellectual leader of the majority faction
of the "Warren Court." Therefore, a study of Black and his jurisprudence is not a mere exercise in eulogistic scholarship, but an
eminently practical method for coming to grips with a mode of
thought which is a continuing vital influence in American law.
This volume was written for the knowledgeable layman. Any lawyer, no matter how far removed from his last encounter with constitutional law, can read it with pleasure and profit Its emphasis is on
Black the Judge; its greatest weakness is that Black, the tennisplaying octogenarian from Birmingham, Alabama, never comes clearly
into view. In other words, there is much of the intellect but too little
of the man. Contrary to popular opinion, Justices are people, and an
understanding of the judge is ultimately dependent on an understanding of the human beneath the robe.
Justice Black emerges from these essays as an independent intellect, a man whom others may follow, but a man who sets his own
course with but little regard for friend or foe. He came to the bench
as a New Deal Senator, committed to the political philosophy which
underlay the major reform legislation of the 1930's. However, Black
has proven to be much more than a partisan politician, as exemplified by his drive to see things as a whole and to define the nature
and scope of American government in terms which any inexperienced
policeman or literate citizen could understand.
Unlike Felix Frankfurter and Oliver Wendell Holmes, for whom
most questions were ultimately matters of degree, Black did not make
a fetish of avoiding formal limitations upon the power of government.
He does not fear government, in fact, Black thinks that it is a positive
good. He believes in federalism, and would allow the states more
latitude in the regulation of commerce than most of his fellow justices.
He believes in the people and is loath to override their opinions
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whether expressed by legislatures or by a petit jury. Yet, Black
also believes that government is limited, not by indefinite rules
formulated by judges to meet the exigencies of a particular situation,
but by guidelines set by the founding fathers and the framers of the
Bill of Rights. The duty of judges is not to ntrike a new balance, but
to apply the principles underlying these constitutional standards to the
ever changing problems of modem society.
From the Foreword by Charles Black, Jr., to the conclusion by
Stephen Strickland, most of the essays are sympathetic to Justice
Black and his approach to the major problems confronting the
Supreme Court during his tenure on the bench. But this is no unrelieved panegyric. Carl Brent Swisher's initial essay, which sets
Black's career in its historical context, is definitely hostile to the course
followed by Black and a majority of the Court since 1952.
[Dlecisions .

.

. sometimes read like fiat determinations made without

reference either to documented history or to clearly expressed principle.1

[Bloth the Court and its critics are apt to find it expedient sometimes
to pretend to a certainty they do not
feel, and thus occasionally to sound
2

forth with unbecoming shrillness.

More and more the Court seemed to be struggling toward the position of
a positive agency of government, an agency defining rights and duties
in advance of individual clashes under the adversary system by which
our courts have traditionally operated. 3

Swisher tactfully, but firmly, carries the main burden of the negative,
but is joined in the penultimate article by George Kaufmann who,
after giving a sympathetic analysis of Black's hostility to the Federal
Civil Rules, concludes, somewhat reluctantly, that the Justice's cure
may be worse than the disease.
This volume also includes an historical essay by John P. Frank on
The New Court and the New Deal, a brief but revealing comment by
Daniel Berman on The Persistent Race ssue, and a rather shrill piece
of scholarly polemic by Irving Dillard, The Individual and the Bill of
Absolute Rights. These are followed by three articles which have appeared elsewhere. That portion of Charles A. Reich's seminal article
Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution4 which proposes a
rational synthesis of Black's judicial philosophy is reprinted along with
1 C. B. Swisher, History's Panorama and Justice Black's Career, in HuGo
SuPn Eas Cou'T: A Symposlm' 23 (S. Strickland ed. 1967).
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[Hereinafter
cited as Strickland.]
2
3

Strickland 24.

Strickland 27.
4 Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HA.v. L.
673 (1963).
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an ably edited version of one of Randolph Paul's last articles, Mr.
Justice Black and Federal Taxationi and finally an essay based on
W. Wallace Kirkpatrick's Crossroads of Antitrust and Union Power,6
and Mr. Justice Black and Antitrust.7 Paul's article includes an excellent concise analysis of the relationship between the Supreme Court
and partisan politics.
As Strickland points out in a brilliant concluding essay, Black as
a judge is too big to be contained either by the labels he has fixed
upon himself or those which have been fastened on him by others. He
is, after some fashion, a liberal, an absolutist, a judicial activist, a
libertarian, and a radical. But none of these labels really fit. Strickland
contends that Black is a Madisonian and ultimately a conservative.
This is a judgment which, unless Black confounds us all by radically
revising his philosophy during yet another decade on the bench, I
believe will stand the test of time.
Harold M. Hollingsworth
Assistant Professor of History
The University of Texas at Arlington

SoU=H. By F. Ray Marshall. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. 406. $8.00.
LABOR N THE

A non-writing law teacher once asked J. Allen Smith "But why
should I write a book review?" and Allen answered, "To show that
you've read a book." In light of repeated claims that law schools need
more social science courses, a brief look at a recent product of one
such social science might be of some relevance.
Perhaps Professor Marshall' will forgive me for using his book to
focus a criticism which involves not only history, but also those other
social sciences traditionally called humanities-including law. Professor Marshall, after all, works in a distinguished tradition and has
inherited, not invented, its vices. He has produced a history of labor
in the South that is both scholarly and disinterested and these are the
book's primary flaws. Filled with facts and figures which are the
5 Paul, Mr. Justice Black and Federal Taxation, 65 YA
L.J. 449 (1956).
6 Kirkpatrick, Crossroads of Antitrust and Union Power, 34 GEo. WAsH. L.

REv. 7288 (1965).

(1957).Kirkpatrick, Mr. Justice Black and Antitrust, 14 U.C.L.A. L. RBv. 475

1 Alumni Professor and Chairman, Department of Economics, University of
Kentucky, Lexington.

